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Abstract
To model discrete-time uncertain processes, we argue
for the use of a global belief model in the form of an
upper expectation that satisfies a number of simple
and intuitive axioms. We motivate these axioms on
the basis of two possible interpretations for this upper
expectation: a behavioural interpretation similar to that
of Walley’s, and an interpretation in terms of upper en-
velopes of linear expectations. Subsequently, we show
that the most conservative upper expectation satisfy-
ing our axioms coincides with a particular version of
the game-theoretic upper expectation introduced by
Shafer and Vovk. This has two important implications.
On the one hand, it guarantees that there is a unique
most conservative global belief model satisfying our
axioms. On the other hand, it shows that Shafer and
Vovk’s model can be given an axiomatic characterisa-
tion, thereby providing an alternative motivation for
adopting this model, even outside their framework.
Keywords: Game-theoretic probability, Upper expec-
tations, Uncertain processes, Coherence
1. Introduction
There are various ways in which discrete-time uncertain
processes, such as Markov processes, can be described
mathematically. For many, measure theory has been the
preferred framework to describe the uncertain dynamics
of these processes. Others may use martingales or a game-
theoretic approach to do so. The common starting point
for all these approaches are the local belief models. They
describe the dynamics of the process from one time instant
to the next. In a measure-theoretic context, they are given
in the form of (sets of) probability charges or (sets of) mea-
sures on the local state space; in a game-theoretic context,
sets of allowable bets are used. When local state-spaces
are assumed finite, as in our case, these descriptions are
all mathematically equivalent. However, it is how these
local models are extended to a global level that differs
greatly from one theory to another. Measure theory uses the
concept of sigma-additivity to do this, leading to a math-
ematically elegant, but rather abstract framework. Apart
from being bounded to the constraint of measurability, it
moreover relies on the questionable assumption of ‘preci-
sion’, in the sense that imprecision is always regarded as
partial information about a ‘precise’ probability measure
or charge. The game-theoretic framework by Shafer and
Vovk has no need for such assumptions. However, since
it defines global upper expectations in a constructive way
using the concept of a ‘supermartingale’, it lacks a concrete
identification in terms of mathematical properties.
Our aim here is to establish a global belief model, in the
form of an upper expectation, that extends the information
gathered in the local models by using a number of mathe-
matical properties. Notably, this model will not be bound to
a single interpretation. Instead, its characterising properties
can be justified starting from a number of different inter-
pretations. We here consider and discuss two of the most
significant; see Section 4. We will then define the desired
global model as the most conservative—the unique model
that does not include any additional information apart from
what is given—under this particular set of properties. In
Section 5, we give a complete axiomatisation for this most
conservative model, serving as an alternative definition.
Finally and most importantly, we show that the obtained
model is equal to a version of the global upper expectation
defined by Shafer and Vovk [3, 4]. On the one hand, this
serves as an additional motivation for the use of our model.
On the other hand, it gives a concrete axiomatisation for
this game-theoretic upper expectation.
2. Upper Expectations
We denote the set of all natural numbers, without 0, by N,
and let N0 := N∪{0}. The set of extended real numbers
is denoted by R := R∪{+∞,−∞} and is endowed with
the usual order topology (corresponding to the two-point
compactification of R). The set of positive real numbers is
denoted by R> and the set of non-negative real numbers by
R≥. We also adopt the conventions that +∞−∞ = −∞+
∞=+∞ and 0 · (+∞) = 0 · (−∞) = 0.
Informally, we will consider a subject that is uncertain
about the value that some variable Y assumes in a non-
empty set Y . More formally, we call any map on Y a
variable; our informal Y is a special case: it corresponds to
the identity map on Y . A subject’s uncertainty about the
unknown value of Y can then be represented by an upper
expectation E: an extended real-valued map on some subset
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D of the setL (Y ) of all extended real-valued variables on
Y . An element f of L (Y ) is simply called an extended
real variable. We say that f is bounded below if there is a
real c such that f (y)≥ c for all y ∈Y , and we say that f is
bounded above if − f is bounded below. An important role
will be reserved for elements f ofL (Y ) that are bounded,
meaning that they are bounded above and below. These
bounded real-valued variables on Y are called gambles,
and we use L (Y ) to denote the set of all of them. The
set of all bounded below elements ofL (Y ) is denoted by
L b(Y ).
Consider now the special case that E is at least defined on
the set of all bounded real-valued variables; soL (Y )⊆D .
Then we call E coherent [9] if it satisfies the following three
coherence axioms:
C1. E( f )≤ sup f for all f ∈L (Y );
C2. E( f +g)≤ E( f )+E(g) for all f ,g ∈L (Y );
C3. E(λ f ) = λE( f ) for all λ ∈ R≥ and f ∈L (Y ).
If we let E be the conjugate lower expectation associated
with E, meaning that E(− f ) := −E( f ) for all f ∈ D , the
following additional properties follow from C1–C3:
C4. f ≤ g⇒ E( f )≤ E(g) for all f ,g ∈L (Y );
C5. inf f ≤ E( f )≤ E( f )≤ sup f for all f ∈L (Y );
C6. E( f +µ) = E( f )+µ for all µ ∈R and all f ∈L (Y );
C7. for any sequence { fn}n∈N0 inL (Y ):
lim
n→+∞sup | f − fn|= 0 ⇒ limn→+∞E( fn) = E( f ).
Proof of C4–C7 We only prove C5. This clearly implies
that E is real-valued onL (Y ), and the remaining proper-
ties then follow from [9, Section 2.6.1.].
First, note that E(0) = 0 because of C3 and our con-
vention that 0 · (+∞) = 0 · (−∞) = 0. Therefore, for all
f ∈L (Y ), it follows from C2 that 0≤ E( f )+E(− f ), or
equivalently, due to our convention that +∞−∞ = −∞+
∞=+∞, that −E(− f )≤ E( f ). Applying C1 to both sides,
we find that inf f =−sup(− f )≤−E(− f )≤ E( f )≤ sup f .
The result now follows readily from the definition of E.
A gamble f is typically interpreted as an uncertain re-
ward or gain that depends on the value that Y takes in
Y ; if Y takes the value y, the (possibly negative) gain is
f (y). Then, according to Walley’s behavioural interpreta-
tion [9], the upper expectation E( f ) of a gamble f is a
subject’s infimum selling price for the gamble f . Axioms
C1–C3 are then called rationality axioms, since they en-
sure that these selling prices are chosen in a rational way.
However, any coherent upper expectation on L (Y ) can
equivalently be represented as an upper envelope of a set
of linear expectations [9, Section 3.3.3]: coherent upper
expectations on L (Y ) that are self-conjugate, meaning
that E( f ) =−E(− f ) for all f ∈L (Y ). According to [1,
Theorem 8.15], linear expectations onL (Y ) are on their
turn in a one-to-one relation with probability charges on
the powerset P(Y ) of Y , being maps µ : P(Y )→R≥ that
are finitely additive and where µ(Y ) = 1 and µ( /0) = 0.
These probability charges are more general than the conven-
tional notion of a probability measure, which additionally
requires σ -additivity. If Y is finite, however, this distinc-
tion disappears.
It follows from the discussion above, that coherent up-
per expectations can be interpreted in two possible ways:
in a direct behavioural way in terms of selling prices for
gambles, or as a supremum over—an upper envelope of—a
set of linear expectations. In this paper, we will not bound
ourselves to any of these two interpretations. Instead, we
will motivate the defining properties of our proposed global
belief model in terms of both of these interpretations.
We conclude this section by introducing a method for
extending the domain of a coherent upper expectation on
L (Y ) to the setL b(Y ) of all extended real variables that
are bounded below. This will prove to be particularly useful
when we introduce game-theoretic upper expectations in
Section 6. We limit ourselves to the special case where
Y is finite. To obtain the desired upper expectation E′ on
L b(Y ), we will impose the following continuity property:
C8. For any non-decreasing sequence { fn}n∈N0 inL (Y ):
lim
n→+∞E
′
( fn) = E
′
( lim
n→+∞ fn).
1
If limn→+∞ fn is a gamble, then if Y is finite, C8 is implied
by C7, and therefore a consequence of coherence (C1–C3).
Property C8 can therefore be regarded as a generalisation
of C7 to extended real variables that are bounded below.
Moreover, any coherent upper expectation E onL (Y ) can
be uniquely extended toL b(Y ) if we impose C8.
Proposition 1 Consider any finite set Y and a coherent
upper expectation E onL (Y ). Then there exists a unique
coherent upper expectation E′ onL b(Y ) that satisfies C8
and coincides with E onL (Y ).
Proof Throughout this proof, for any f ∈ L b(Y ), we
let { f∧n}n∈N0 be the sequence defined by f∧n(y) :=
min{ f (y),n} for all n ∈ N0 and all y ∈ Y . We first prove
the existence of E′. Let E′ be the extended real-valued map
defined by E′( f ) = limn→+∞E( f∧n) for all f ∈ L b(Y ).
Since E satisfies C4 [because it is coherent] and { f∧n}n∈N0
is non-decreasing, the limit limn→+∞E( f∧n) exists, imply-
ing that E′ is well defined. That it coincides with E on
L (Y ) follows from the fact that for all f ∈L (Y ) and
1. Here, as well as in what follows, limits of variables are always in-
tended to be taken pointwise.
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n≥max f , f∧n = f . Since E is a coherent upper expecta-
tion, this immediately implies that E′ is a coherent upper
expectation as well. We now show that it satisfies C8.
Consider any f ∈ L b(Y ) and a non-decreasing se-
quence {gn}n∈N0 in L (Y ) that converges pointwise to
f . Since E′ satisfies C4 and {gn}n∈N0 is non-decreasing,
the limit limn→+∞E′(gn) exists. Fix any n ∈ N0. Be-
cause gn ≤ f , we have that gn ≤ f∧n′ for all n′ ∈ N0
such that n′ ≥ maxgn. This implies by C4 that E′(gn) ≤
E′( f∧n′) for all n′ ∈ N0 such that n′ ≥maxgn, so E′(gn)≤
limn′→+∞E′( f∧n
′
) = limn′→+∞E( f∧n
′
) = E′( f ). Since this
holds for any n∈N0, we have that limn→+∞E′(gn)≤ E′( f ).
To prove the other inequality, fix any ε > 0 and any n′ ∈N0.
Since {gn}n∈N0 increases pointwise to f , and f∧n
′
is a gam-
ble such that f∧n′ ≤ f , there is an index n∗(y) for each
y ∈ Y such that f∧n′(y)− ε ≤ gn(y) for all n≥ n∗(y). Let
nmax := maxy∈Y n∗(y). Since Y is finite, this maximum is
attained. So we have that f∧n′−ε ≤ gn for all n≥ nmax . By
C4 and C6, this in turn implies that E′( f∧n′)− ε ≤ E′(gn)
for all n ≥ nmax . Hence, E′( f∧n′)− ε ≤ limn→+∞E′(gn).
This holds for any n′ ∈ N0, implying that
E′( f )− ε = lim
n′→+∞
E′( f∧n
′
)− ε ≤ lim
n→+∞E
′(gn),
and since this holds for any ε > 0, we indeed find that
E′( f )≤ limn→+∞E′(gn). Hence, we conclude that E′ satis-
fies C8, establishing the existence of E′.
To prove the uniqueness of E′, consider two coherent
upper expectations E′1 and E
′
2 on L b(Y ) that both sat-
isfy C8 and coincide with E onL (Y ). Consider now any
f ∈L b(X ) and a non-decreasing sequence { fn}n∈N0 in
L (Y ) that converges pointwise to f . Since E′1 and E
′
2
coincide with E on all gambles, we directly have that
limn→+∞E′1( fn) = limn→+∞E
′
2( fn). Applying C8 to E
′
1
and E′2 therefore implies that E
′
1( f ) = E
′
2( f ), proving the
uniqueness of E′.
3. Upper Expectations in Discrete-Time
Uncertain Processes
We consider a discrete-time uncertain process, being a
sequence X1,X2, ...,Xn, ... of uncertain states, where the
state Xk at each discrete time k ∈ N takes values in a fixed
non-empty finite setX , called the state space.
Let a situation x1:n be any finite string (x1, ...,xn) ∈
X 1:n := X n of possible state values. In particular, the
unique empty string x1:0, denoted by , is called the initial
situation:X 1:0 := {}. We denote the set of all situations
byX ∗ := ∪n∈N0X1:n. We also use the generic notations s
and t to denote any situation.
To model our uncertainty about the dynamics of an uncer-
tain process, we associate, with every situation x1:n ∈X ∗,
a coherent upper expectation Qx1:n onL (X ). This upper
expectation expresses a subject’s beliefs about the uncer-
tain value of the next state Xn+1 when she has observed
that X1 = x1,X2 = x2, · · · ,Xn−1 = xn−1 and Xn = xn. As dis-
cussed in the previous section, these upper expectations can
be given both a behavioural interpretation or an interpreta-
tion in terms of upper envelopes of expectations. We will
also refer to Qx1:n as the local model or upper expectation
associated with x1:n, because it gives information about
how the process changes from one time instant to the next.
An imprecise probability treeT is a function that maps any
situation s to its corresponding coherent upper expectation
Qs. Hence, an imprecise probability tree T models the
dynamics of the uncertain process as a whole.
In practice, the local behaviour of an uncertain process
is typically learned from physical measurements or elicited
from experts. For instance, we usually have some infor-
mation about ‘The probability of throwing heads on the
next coin toss’, ‘The expected amount of goods that are
sold by a certain shop on a single day’, ‘The probability
of rain tomorrow’, ... However, it is less straightforward
how we should gather information about other, more gen-
eral inferences such as ‘The expected number of tosses
until the first tails is thrown’, ‘The probability of being out
of stock on a given day’, ... Moreover, even if we could
in principle do so, it is often not possible or feasible to
gather all the necessary information because of time and
budget limitations. Hence, the question arises: ‘How and
to which extent, can we extend the information captured
in the local models towards global information about the
entire process?’. To answer this question, we will represent
this global information with a so-called global belief model,
being a particular kind of upper expectation. Before we
proceed to do so, we finish this section with some further
notation about uncertain processes.
An infinite sequence x1x2x3 · · · of state values is called
a path, which we denote by ω = x1x2x3 · · · . We gather all
paths in the sample space Ω :=X N. For any path ω ∈Ω,
the situation x1:n = x1x2 · · ·xn that consists of its first n state
values is denoted by ωn ∈X1:n. The state value xn at time
n is denoted by ωn ∈X . An event A⊆Ω is a collection of
paths, and in particular, the cylinder event Γ(x1:n) := {ω ∈
Ω : ωn = x1:n} of some situation x1:n ∈X ∗, is the set of
all paths ω ∈Ω that go through the situation x1:n.
A variable on Ω is called a global variable and we gather
all extended real ones in V := L (Ω). Similarly, we let
Vb :=L b(Ω) andV :=L (Ω). For any natural k≤ `, we let
Xk:` be the global variable defined by Xk:`(ω) :=(ωk, ...,ω`)
for all ω ∈ Ω. As such, the state Xk = Xk:k at time k can
also be regarded as a global variable. Moreover, for any
natural k ≤ ` and any map f : X `−k+1→ R, we will write
f (Xk:`) to denote the global extended real variable defined
by f (Xk:`) := f ◦Xk:`. We call a global extended real vari-
able f n-measurable for some n ∈ N0, if it only depends
on the initial n state values; so f (ω1) = f (ω2) for any
3
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two paths ω1 and ω2 such that ωn1 = ω
n
2 . We will then
use the notation f (x1:n) for its constant value f (ω) on all
paths ω ∈ Γ(x1:n). The indicator IA of an event A is de-
fined as the global variable that assumes the value 1 on
A and 0 elsewhere. Hence, the indicator Ix1:n := IΓ(x1:n) of
the cylinder event Γ(x1:n) for some x1:n ∈X ∗ is clearly an
n-measurable variable. Finally, we call any f ∈ V finitary
if it is n-measurable for some n ∈N0. We gather all finitary
gambles in Vfin.
4. In Search of a Global Belief Model
Any extended real-valued map E: V×X ∗ → R will be
called a global upper expectation. Given an imprecise prob-
ability tree T that associates a local upper expectation Qs
with every situation s ∈X ∗, we aim to define a global
upper expectation E that extends the information included
in these local models in a rational way. To do so, we will
impose the following properties.
P1. For any f ∈L (X ) and any x1:n ∈X ∗,
E( f (Xn+1)|x1:n) = Qx1:n( f ).
P2. For any f ∈ Vfin and any s ∈X ∗,
E( f |s) = E( f Is|s).
P3. For any f ∈ Vfin and any k ∈ N0,
E( f |X1:k)≤ E(E( f |X1:k+1)|X1:k).
P4. For any f ,g ∈ V and any s ∈X ∗,
f ≤ g⇒ E( f |s)≤ E(g|s).
P5. For any sequence { fn}n∈N0 of finitary gambles that is
uniformly bounded below and any s ∈X ∗:
lim
n→+∞ fn = f ⇒ limsupn→+∞ E( fn|s)≥ E( f |s).
Here, as well as further on, we call a sequence { fn}n∈N0 of
extended real variables uniformly bounded below if there
is a real c such that fn(ω)≥ c for all n ∈ N0 and ω ∈Ω.
To motivate the use of P1–P5, we need to link some inter-
pretational meaning to E. We here consider two particular
ones, similar to what we have done for the coherent upper
expectations in Section 2.
We start from the interpretation of a global gamble f ∈V
as an uncertain reward depending on the path ω that the
uncertain process takes in Ω. However, it is not clear what
this exactly means if the gamble f depends on the entire
length of the path. Indeed, the gamble f depends on an infi-
nite number of subsequent state values, so there is no point
in time when we can actually exchange the reward linked
to the gamble f . The same interpretational problem arises
when considering unbounded or extended real variables
(on a general set Y ). The simple interpretation of an uncer-
tain reward does not suffice here because the reward itself
can be unbounded or infinite, which is unrealistic—or even
meaningless—in practice. For that reason, we prefer to only
attach a direct practical meaning to the value E( f |s) of a
global upper expectation E for a finitary gamble f ∈ Vfin
conditional on a situation s ∈X ∗. Indeed, these finitary
gambles themselves can be given a meaningful interpreta-
tion because they take real values and only depend on the
state at a finite number of time instances.
We distinguish the following two ways for interpreting
the global upper expectation E( f |s) of a finitary gamble
f ∈ Vfin conditional on a situation s ∈X ∗:
• Behavioural interpretation. It is a subject’s infimum
selling price for f contingent on the event Γ(s), meaning
that, for any α > E( f |s), she is willing to accept the
uncertain reward associated with the gamble Is(α− f ).
• An upper envelope. It is the supremum value of E( f |s),
where E belongs to some given set E of conditional linear
expectation operators: E( f |s) = sup{E( f |s) : E ∈ E}.
Since P1–P3 only apply to finitary gambles, a direct
justification for these axioms can easily be given for each
of the above interpretations. Property P1 imposes that the
global model E should be compatible with the local mod-
els Qs. The desirability of this property is self-evident, no
matter which interpretation is used. Property P2 says that
the upper expectation of a finitary gamble f conditional
on s should only depend on the value of f on the paths
ω ∈ Γ(s). This property is clearly desirable when using the
behavioural interpretation, because Is(α− f ) only depends
on the restriction of f to Γ(s). It is also quite evident that
this property is desirable for an upper envelope of con-
ditional linear expectations, because P2 is true for these
conditional linear expectations themselves. Similarly, that
P3 should hold under the upper envelope interpretation, is
motivated by the fact that conditional linear expectations
satisfy P3 with equality—then better known as the law
of iterated expectation; an upper envelope of conditional
expectations is therefore guaranteed to satisfy P3. In or-
der to see that property P3 is also desirable according to
the behavioural interpretation, one requires a conditional
version of the notion of coherence that we discussed in
Section 2 [9, 10, 1].2 Explaining why this is the case, and
what this conditional notion of coherence exactly entails,
would however lead us too far. Basically, if P3 would not
hold, the selling prices that are implied by E would allow
for a Dutch book—a loss no matter the outcome—which
we consider irrational.
2. There are several versions of conditional coherence [9, 10, 1], how-
ever, in the case where variables take values in a finite set, all these
different versions are mathematically equivalent.
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Having attached an interpretation to finitary gambles and
their conditional upper expectations, we now proceed to
do the same for more general variables. We have already
argued that no direct practical meaning can be given to such
variables. However, this should not be taken to imply that
an uncertainty model should not be able to deal with them.
In fact, they can serve as useful abstract idealisations of
(sequences of) variables that can be given a direct practical
meaning. In particular, any extended real variable f that
is bounded below and that can be written as the pointwise
limit limn→+∞ fn of some sequence of finitary gambles
{ fn}n∈N0 , we will regard as an abstract idealisation of fn
for large n. We gather these limits in the set
Vb,lim := { f ∈ Vb : f = limn→+∞ fn for
some sequence { fn}n∈N0 in Vfin}.
Since P5 applies to precisely these kinds of variables, this
axiom can be justified by extending the above idealisation
from the variables f to their upper expectations E( f |s). Ba-
sically, since f is an abstract idealisation of fn for large
n, E( f |s) should be an abstract idealisation of E( fn|s) for
large n. The practical benefit of this is that we can then use
E( f |s) to reason about E( fn|s) for a generic large value of n,
without having to specify the specific value of n. The prob-
lem, however, is that the sequence {E( fn|s)}n∈N0 may not
converge. What we then do know for sure, however, is that
as n approaches infinity, E( fn|s) will oscillate between the
limit superior and inferior of {E( fn|s)}n∈N0 . Since we want
E( f |s) to serve as an idealisation of E( fn|s) for generic
large values of n, E( f |s) should therefore definitely not
exceed the limit superior, as this would result in an unwar-
ranted loss of information. We therefore impose P5.
The final property that we impose is P4, which states
that E should be monotone. For finitary gambles f and
g, this follows easily from either of our two different in-
terpretations for E( f |s) and E(g|s). Under a behavioural
interpretation, since the reward associated with g is at least
as high as that of f , the same should be true for a subject’s
selling prices for these two gambles. Under an interpreta-
tion in terms of upper envelopes of expectations, mono-
tonicity of the envelope is implied by the monotonicity of
each of the individual expectations. If f and g are more
general variables—so not necessarily finitary gambles—the
motivation for P4 is that still, higher rewards—even if ab-
stract and idealized—should correspond to higher upper
expectations. It is also worth noting that the combination
of P4 and P5 implies that E is continuous with respect to
non-decreasing sequences of finitary gambles. In a measure-
theoretic context, this kind of continuity is usually obtained
as a consequence of the assumption of σ -additivity [6, 2].
We will show in Section 6 that P1–P5 are compatible,
in the sense that if the local models Qs are coherent, there
always is at least one global upper expectation E satisfying
P1–P5. This would, for example, not be the case if we re-
place P5 by the stronger property of continuity with respect
to pointwise convergence.
However, there may be more than one global upper ex-
pectation E satisfying P1–P5. In that case, the best thing
to do, we think, is to choose the most conservative model
among those that satisfy P1–P5, as choosing any other
would mean adding information that is not implied by our
axioms. We will denote this most conservative global upper
expectation by E∗. As we will see in Section 6, E∗ is guar-
anteed to exist, and furthermore coincides with a particular
version of the game-theoretic upper expectation defined by
Shafer and Vovk [3, 5].
Of course, in order for our definition of E∗ to make sense,
we need to know what it means for an upper expectation E∗
to be more conservative than some other upper expectation
E. We here take this to mean that E∗ is higher than E. So
higher upper expectations are more conservative, or less
informative. In fact, we already used this implicitly in our
motivation for P5, when we talked about an unwarranted
‘loss of information’. That it is indeed reasonable to regard
higher expectations as more conservative, can again be mo-
tivated using either of the two interpretations that we con-
sidered before. Under the behavioural interpretation, higher
upper expectations means higher selling prices, which is
clearly more conservative. Using an interpretation in terms
of upper envelopes of expectations, higher upper expecta-
tions correspond to larger sets of expectations, which is
again less informative and hence more conservative.
All of that said, we would like to stress that—despite our
extensive use of them to motivate our axioms—none of the
results that we are about to develop hinge on a particular
interpretation for upper expectations. Other interpretations
could also be adopted, or perhaps even no interpretation at
all. All that is needed is to agree on P1–P5 and on the fact
that higher upper expectations are more conservative.
5. An Axiomatisation of E∗
For a given imprecise probability tree T , let E1−2(T ) be
the set of all global upper expectations satisfying P1–P2,
and similarly for E1−4(T ) and E1−5(T ). In this section,
we introduce sufficient conditions for a global upper ex-
pectation E to be the most conservative among all upper
expectations in E1−5(T ). We will start by considering the
domain of finitary gambles and then, step by step, extend
the domain and introduce additional conditions on E such
that it is the most conservative on this extended domain.
For any situation x1:n ∈X ∗ and any (n+1)-measurable
gamble f , we use f (x1:n·) to denote the gamble onX that
assumes the value f (x1:n+1) on xn+1 ∈X , and then use
f (x1:nXn+1) as a shorthand for f (x1:n·)(Xn+1). The follow-
ing lemma establishes compatibility with the local models
in a stronger way than P1 does.
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Lemma 2 Consider any E ∈ E1−2(T ). Then, for any sit-
uation x1:n ∈X ∗ and any (n+1)-measurable gamble f ,
E( f |x1:n) = Qx1:n( f (x1:n·)).
Proof Fix any x1:n ∈X ∗ and any (n+1)-measurable gam-
ble f . Note that f (x1:nXn+1)Ix1:n = f Ix1:n and hence, be-
cause of P2, E( f |x1:n) = E( f (x1:nXn+1)|x1:n). P1 therefore
implies that E( f |x1:n) = Qx1:n( f (x1:n·)).
To ensure that E is the most conservative upper expecta-
tion on the domain of all finitary gambles, we impose the
following property, known as the law of iterated upper
expectations:
P3’. For any f ∈ Vfin and any k ∈ N0,
E( f |X1:k) = E(E( f |X1:k+1)|X1:k).
Proposition 3 Consider any E ∈ E1−4(T ) that satisfies
P3’. Then, for any E′ ∈ E1−4(T ), we have that
E( f |s)≥ E′( f |s) for all f ∈ Vfin and all s ∈X ∗.
Proof Fix any f ∈ Vfin and any x1:m ∈ X ∗. We show
that E′( f |x1:m) ≤ E( f |x1:m) for all E′ ∈ E1−4(T ). Since
f is finitary, it is n-measurable for some n ∈ N0. We can
assume that m+2< n without loss of generality, because
f is obviously also p-measurable for every p≥ n. Now, it
follows from P3 that
E′( f |x1:m)≤ E′(E′( f |X1:m+1)|x1:m).
Repeating this argument and using P4, gives us
E′( f |x1:m)≤ E′(E′(· · ·E′( f |X1:n−1) · · · |X1:m+1)|x1:m).
(1)
For any p ∈ N0 and any (p+1)-measurable gamble g, we
now let QX1:p(g) be the p-measurable gamble defined by
QX1:p(g)(ω) := Qω p(g(ω
p·)) for all ω ∈Ω.
Note that QX1:p(g) is indeed a gamble because of coherence
[C5] and the fact that g is a gamble. Then, because E′
satisfies P1 and P2, it follows from Lemma 2 that
E′(g|X1:p) = QX1:p(g).
Applying this to Equation (1) gives us
E′( f |x1:m)≤ E′(E′(· · ·QX1:n−1( f ) · · · |X1:m+1)|x1:m),
and repeating the argument results in
E′( f |x1:m)≤ Qx1:m
(
QX1:m+1
( · · ·QX1:n−1( f ) · · ·)) .
Since E also satisfies P1 and P2, we can reverse these steps
[again using Lemma 2], to find that
E′( f |x1:m) ≤ E(E(· · ·E( f |X1:n−1) · · · |X1:m+1)|x1:m),
and since E satisfies P3’, this results in E′( f |x1:m) ≤
E( f |x1:m).
Next, we consider the domain Vb,lim ⊂ V of all extended
real variables that are bounded below and that can be writ-
ten as the pointwise limit of a sequence of finitary gambles.
The following condition, together with P3’, is sufficient
for an upper expectation E to be the most conservative on
Vb,lim among all upper expectations in E1−5(T ).
P6. For any f ∈Vb,lim and any s∈X ∗, there is a sequence
{ fn}n∈N0 of n-measurable gambles that is uniformly
bounded below and that converges pointwise to f such
that
lim
n→+∞E( fn|s) = E( f |s).
Proposition 4 Consider any E ∈ E1−5(T ) that satisfies
P3’ and P6. Then, for any E′ ∈ E1−5(T ), we have that
E( f |s)≥ E′( f |s) for all f ∈ Vb,lim and all s ∈X ∗.
Proof Fix any f ∈ Vb,lim, any s ∈ X ∗ and any E′ ∈
E1−5(T ). According to P6, there is a sequence { fn}n∈N0 of
n-measurable gambles that is uniformly bounded below and
that converges pointwise to f such that limn→+∞E( fn|s) =
E( f |s), and therefore also
limsup
n→+∞
E( fn|s) = E( f |s). (2)
Because all fn are finitary gambles and both E and E
′ are
upper expectations in E1−4(T ), with E additionally satis-
fying P3’, we can apply Proposition 3 to find that
limsup
n→+∞
E′( fn|s)≤ limsup
n→+∞
E( fn|s). (3)
Furthermore, since { fn}n∈N0 is a sequence of finitary gam-
bles that is uniformly bounded below and that converges
pointwise to f , P5 implies that
E′( f |s)≤ limsup
n→+∞
E′( fn|s).
Combining this with Equations (2) and (3), we find that
E′( f |s)≤ E( f |s).
Finally, we consider the entire domain V. Then, in order for
an upper expectation to be the most conservative, it suffices
to additionally impose the following property.
P7. For any f ∈ V and any s ∈X ∗,
E( f |s) = inf
{
E(g|s) : g ∈ Vb,lim and g≥ f
}
.
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Theorem 5 Consider any E ∈ E1−5(T ) that satisfies P3’,
P6 and P7. Then, for any E′ ∈ E1−5(T ), we have that
E( f |s)≥ E′( f |s) for all f ∈ V and all s ∈X ∗.
Proof Fix any f ∈ V, any s ∈X ∗ and any E′ ∈ E1−5(T ).
According to P7, we have that
E( f |s) = inf
{
E(g|s) : g ∈ Vb,lim and g≥ f
}
.
Then, using Proposition 4, we get
inf
{
E′(g|s) : g ∈ Vb,lim and g≥ f
}
≤ inf
{
E(g|s) : g ∈ Vb,lim and g≥ f
}
= E( f |s).
Since, for any g ∈ Vb,lim such that f ≤ g, we have that
E′( f |s)≤ E′(g|s) because E′ satisfies P4, we find that
E′( f |s)≤ inf
{
E′(g|s) : g ∈ Vb,lim and g≥ f
}
≤ E( f |s),
proving the stated.
Hence, according to Theorem 5, if there is an upper ex-
pectation E ∈ E1−5(T ) satisfying P3’, P6 and P7, it is
the unique most conservative in E1−5(T ) and therefore
equal to the global belief model E∗ that we are after. So it
remains to show that there is at least one (and then neces-
sarily unique) global upper expectation in E1−5(T ) that
additionally satisfies P3’, P6 and P7.
6. Game-theoretic Upper Expectations
In this section, we show that a particular version of the
game-theoretic upper expectation defined by Shafer and
Vovk [3, 5] belongs to E1−5 and furthermore satisfies P3’,
P6 and P7, thereby implying the existence of E∗. This
game-theoretic upper expectation relies on the concept of a
supermartingale (first introduced by Ville [8]), which is a
capital process—the evolution of a subject’s capital—that
is obtained by betting against a system. The system—called
forecaster in Shafer and Vovk’s framework—determines for
each situation a number of allowable bets which a subject—
called skeptic in Shafer and Vovk’s framework—can choose
from. These allowable bets define the model, similar to
what we here do by defining an imprecise probability tree.
In general however, they allow for more general settings
where local models need not be coherent and state spaces
can be infinite. We here consider one particular version.
Once more, we assume that a local coherent upper expec-
tation Qs on L (X ) is given for every situation s ∈X ∗.
However, to introduce the game-theoretic upper expectation
in its desired form, the local models should be defined on
the extended domainL b(X ) of all extended real variables
that are bounded below. In particular, Shafer and Vovk [4, 5]
start from local models that satisfy a modified version of
the coherence axioms C1–C3, generalised to extended real
variables. We show in [7] that, for finite state spaces, these
modified axioms are equivalent to a combination of coher-
ence with C8. In order to adhere to their framework, we
therefore need to extend the domain of our local models
fromL (X ) toL b(X ) in such a way that this extension
satisfies C8. According to Proposition 1, such an extension
always exists and is furthermore unique. Without loss of
generality, we can therefore henceforth assume that our
local models Qs are defined onL b(X ), are coherent and
satisfy C8.3
For a given imprecise probability tree T , let Mb be
the set of all supermartingales, being maps M : X ∗ →
R∪{+∞} that are uniformly bounded below, i.e. there is a
real c such thatM (s)≥ c for all s ∈X ∗, and that satisfy
Qs(M (s·)) ≤M (s) for all s ∈ X ∗. In the last expres-
sion we used the notationM (s·) to denote the variable in
L b(X ) that takes the valueM (sx) for each x ∈X . Note
that we here indeed use the fact that the local models are
defined on the domainL b(X ). For anyM ∈Mb, we also
let liminfM be the extended real variable that takes the
value liminfn→+∞M (ωn) for each ω ∈ Ω. Furthermore,
for any two f and g in V we write f ≥s g if f (ω)≥ g(ω)
for all paths ω ∈ Γ(s). The global game-theoretic upper
expectation EV : V×X ∗→ R is now defined by
EV( f |s) := inf{M (s) : M ∈Mb and liminfM ≥s f},
for all f ∈ V and all s ∈X ∗. Crucially, this global game-
theoretic upper expectation EV is an element of E1−5(T )
satisying P3’, P6 and P7.
Proposition 6 EV is an element of E1−5(T ) and further-
more satisfies P3’, P6 and P7.
Proof We prove that EV satisfies P1–P5, P3’, P6 and P7.
Axiom P1 follows immediately from [7, Proposition 15]. In-
deed, consider any h∈L (X ). Since h(Xn+1) is an (n+1)-
measurable gamble, [7, Proposition 15] tells us that
E(h(Xn+1)|x1:n) = Qx1:n(h(Xn+1)(x1:n·)) = Qx1:n(h).
To prove P2, observe that liminfM ≥s f if and only if
liminfM ≥s f Is for all f ∈ V and allM ∈Mb. Then the
desired equality follows directly from the definition of EV.
P3 and P3’ follow immediately from [7, Theorem 16]. Prop-
erties P4, P6 and P7 immediately follow from respectively
3. Apart from the fact that imposing C8 allows us to apply the frame-
work of Shafer and Vovk, it is also consistent with our requirement
that a global upper expectation should satisfy P4 and P5 because—
as mentioned in Section 4—these imply continuity with respect to
non-decreasing sequences of finitary gambles. Hence, if we let the
extended local models be defined as restrictions of the global model
to local variables, they clearly coincide with the original local models
and moreover satisfy C8.
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Proposition 13 (V4), Proposition 33 and Proposition 34 in
[7]. Note that in these results Vb,lim has a slightly different
definition, as it there also includes pointwise limits of possi-
bly extended real finitary variables. However, according to
[7, Lemma 8], this alternative definition is equivalent with
the definition of Vb,lim that we have adopted here, allow-
ing us to directly apply the results in [7]. Finally, property
P5 follows from [7, Lemma 27], which says that, for any
sequence { fn}n∈N0 in Vb that is uniformly bounded below,
EV(liminf
n→+∞ fn|s)≤ liminfn→+∞ EV( fn|s).
Indeed, in the special case that { fn}n∈N0 is a sequence
of finitary gambles that is uniformly bounded below and
converges pointwise to some variable f ∈ Vb, this implies
EV( f |s)≤ liminf
n→+∞ EV( fn|s)≤ limsupn→+∞ EV( fn|s).
Theorem 7 The set E1−5(T ) is non-empty. Moreover,
there is a unique most conservative upper expectation E∗
in E1−5(T ) and it is equal to the global game-theoretic
upper expectation EV.
Proof Immediate from Theorem 5 and Proposition 6.
7. Discussion
Shafer and Vovk define their game-theoretic upper expecta-
tions using supermartingales. Their definition is therefore
constructive and can be given a clear interpretation in terms
of capital processes and betting behaviour. However, it re-
quires that one allows unbounded and even infinite-valued
bets, which we find questionable from an interpretational
point of view. Furthermore, a complete axiomatisation of
EV in terms of its mathematical properties has, according
to the best of our knowledge, been absent until this point.
Theorem 7 addresses both of these issues. First, it provides
an abstract axiomatisation for EV using P3’, P6 and P7 in
addition to P1–P5. Most importantly, however, Theorem 7
provides an alternative definition— and interpretation—for
EV as the most conservative upper expectation under a lim-
ited set of intuitive properties: P1–P5. This strengthens the
choice of using EV as a global upper expectation, because it
can now be motivated from both a game-theoretic point of
view and from a purely axiomatic point of view. A reader
should not even be familiar with the concepts of game-
theoretic probability in order to use EV as global upper
expectation. Put simply, he only has to agree on the axioms
P1–P5. And even if he preferred to impose additional ax-
ioms, then still, EV would serve as a conservative upper
bound for his desired upper expectation.
8. Additional Properties
Of course, there is more to an uncertainty model than only
a compelling axiomatisation or interpretation. Te be prac-
tically useful, its mathematical properties should also be
sufficiently powerful. For instance, the popularity of the
Lebesgue integral as a tool for defining expected values, is
in part due to its strong continuity properties (e.g. the Dom-
inated Convergence Theorem [6, 2]). What may perhaps
be somewhat surprising, is that despite the simplicity of
our axioms P1–P5, our most conservative model EV = E∗
scores well on this account as well. For example, it satisfies
the following generalisation of coherence.
Proposition 8 [7, Proposition 13] For all f ,g ∈ V, all
λ ∈ R≥, all µ ∈ R and all s ∈X ∗, E∗ satisfies
V1. infω∈Γ(s) f (ω)≤ E∗( f |s)≤ supω∈Γ(s) f (ω);
V2. E∗( f +g|s)≤ E∗( f |s)+E∗(g|s);
V3. E∗(λ f |s) = λE∗( f |s);
V4. E∗( f +µ|s) = E∗( f |s)+µ .
Another important result, better known as Fatou’s
Lemma, shows that the upper bound imposed by prop-
erty P5 for a global upper expectation E( f |s) of a variable
f ∈ Vb,lim, is not attained by the most conservative upper
expectation E∗ in E1−5(T ). Interestingly enough, it can be
replaced by a tighter one.
Lemma 9 [7, Lemma 27] For any s ∈X ∗ and any se-
quence { fn}n∈N0 in Vb that is uniformly bounded below:
E∗(liminf
n→+∞ fn|s)≤ liminfn→+∞ E
∗
( fn|s).
The following two theorems show that E∗ satisfies
continuity with respect to both non-decreasing and non-
increasing sequences of variables. However, continuity with
respect to non-increasing sequences is only guaranteed if
we consider sequences of finitary gambles.
Theorem 10 [7, Theorem 24] For any s ∈X ∗ and any
non-decreasing sequence { fn}n∈N0 in Vb that converges
point-wise to f ∈ Vb, we have that
E∗( f |s) = lim
n→+∞E
∗
( fn|s).
Theorem 11 [7, Corollary 31] For any s ∈X ∗ and any
non-increasing sequence { fn}n∈N0 of finitary gambles that
converges point-wise to a variable f ∈ V, we have that
E∗( f |s) = lim
n→+∞E
∗
( fn|s).
Apart from the brief overview above, EV = E∗ also satis-
fies a weak and a strong law of large numbers, a law of the
iterated logarithm, Lévy’s zero-one law, and many more
surprisingly strong properties; we refer the interested reader
to the work of Shafer and Vovk [3, 5, 4].
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9. Conclusion
We have put forward a small set of simple axioms P1–P5
for a global upper expectation that models a subject’s uncer-
tainty about a discrete-time process. We have established
the existence of a unique most conservative model under
these axioms, and additionally gave sufficient conditions to
uniquely characterise this most conservative model. More-
over, this most conservative upper expectation was shown
to coincide with a version of the game-theoretic upper
expectation used by Shafer and Vovk, and therefore has
particularly powerful mathematical properties, despite the
simplicity of our defining axioms.
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